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Two general claims are made in this work. First, we need several different layers of
“theory,” in particular for understanding human behavior. These layers should concern: the
cognitive (mental) representations and mechanisms; the neural underlying processes; the
evolutionary history and adaptive functions of our cognition and behaviors; the emergent
and complex social structures and dynamics, their relation and feedbacks on individual
minds and behaviors, and the relationship between internal regulating goals and the
external functions/roles of our conduct; the historical and cultural mechanisms shaping our
minds and behaviors; the developmental paths. Second, we do not just need “predictions”
and “laws” but also “explanations”; that is, we need to identify the mechanisms producing
(here-and-now, or diachronically) a given phenomenon. “Laws” are not enough; they
are simply descriptive and predictive; we need the “why” and “how.” Correlations are
not enough (and they are frequently misleading). We need computational models of the
processes postulated in our theories1.
Keywords: reductionism, cognitive architecture, emergence, intentions, functions, computer modeling and
simulation, proximate causes
THE NEED FOR EXPLANATION: MAIN ISSUES
We do not just need a “pluralistic” approach (as radically inter-
disciplinary) but a “layered” theory of our “objects” (Dale, 2008).
We need (at least) six layers and axes of theory; not just predictions
but explanations, that is, we need to identify the explicit deﬁni-
tion/understanding of the mechanisms producing (here-and-now
or diachronically) a given phenomenon. In particular for human
behavior we need:
(A) Modeling the cognitive (mental)mechanisms producing and gov-
erning (controlling) our behavior. That is, we have to explain
a given behavior with its “proximate” causes: micro-processes,
irreducible to the vocabulary (ontology) of neuro-processes.
(B) The neural and body implementation of psychological represen-
tations and processes. We should know not only where they
are located in the brain, but the brain micro-mechanisms and
emergent cognitive processes, and why they work there.
(C) The biological evolution of our behavior (and its “causes”:
adaptive functions, niche, environmental constraints) and
of the mental (cognitive, motivational, affective) mecha-
nisms selected for governing it. Without understanding the
“origin,” the diachronic causes, we cannot fully explain a
phenomenon.
(C1) This requires the understanding of the relation between
our genes and our behavior; the dispositions selected
by evolution, and how they inﬂuence our mental pro-
cesses and behavior, and how these inherited“programs”
interact with experience, learning, and culture.
1I would like to thank my friends and collaborators at the ISTC-CNR GoalGroup
for discussions and criticisms on these issue, especially Maria Miceli for her help;
and Yurij Castelfranchi for useful suggestions and remarks. I also in debt with two
anonymous reviewers for their criticisms and suggestions.
(C2) This also requires the understanding of the relations
between the two kinds of teleology that impinge on us:
the internal goals regulating/controlling our action vs.
the external functions of our conduct.
(D) The emergent, collective, self-organizing effects of our behaviors,
and their mechanisms and dynamics; how complexity deter-
mines the “social orders.” An analytic and dynamic theory of
the “invisible hand.” Otherwise, we cannot understand soci-
eties, etc., as well as the relation between emergent collective
phenomena and our intentions and mental representations:
How is it possible that we “pursue” ends that we do not are
aware of and are not among our intentions? We also need to
explain how the emergent structure/order feedbacks into, and
shapes, our minds and behaviors: not just the“emergence”but
also the “immergence” processes.
(E) Thehistorical and cultural evolution– itsmechanisms, not just
its description and narration – shaping our minds and behav-
iors, through learning, practices and technologies, norms, and
so on. The cultural evolution is not less relevant than the bio-
logical one for understanding why we are as we are; and our
historical and cultural differences.
(F) We need the modeling of developmental processes, also
because some causes of our adult behavior can be found
in our personal and relational development (Developmental
Cognitive Sciences).
We needs at least all these layers and perspectives (diachronic
and evolutional) for explaining our behaviors. Laws are not
enough. They are simply descriptive and predictive; we need
the “why,” the “how” (see Cognitive Mechanisms Producing and
Controlling Our Behavior & Computational Science for Recon-
ciling “Emergence” with “Cognition”6). Of course, the need for
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explaining (not just predicting anddescribing)with theunderlying
devices the observed and observable phenomena, is particularly
crucial for the cognitive and behavioral sciences, where the observ-
able phenomena are due to unobservable postulated variables into
the minds. But – in my view – is not valid only for human sci-
ences. To be less schematic and more correct, let me say that there
are in the natural science “laws” that do really explain in terms
of causal underlying “mechanisms” producing the phenomenon
and its dynamics. This is the case – in my view – for exam-
ple of mutation and selection mechanisms explaining Darwinian
evolution; although also these mechanisms and laws have to be
explained at their micro layer in terms of genes and DNA mecha-
nisms. However, many important “laws” in natural science are not
really “explanatory” of the “why” and “how,” of the mechanism.
For example, the most famous natural law, Newton’s gravity, is
more descriptive than based on the explanation of the (micro)
mechanisms producing/causing attraction. We are still in search
of the real causal explanation: the “graviton.”At the higher level of
course that law predicts but also causally “explain”why something
(pears) falls to the ground (from the trees).
No brain map too is enough: it is just cartography, descrip-
tive rather than explicative (see The Neural Implementation of
Psychological Representations and Processes).
Correlations are not enough and they are frequently mislead-
ing (Concluding Remarks). Theories should be complemented by
models of the processes that produce and control people’s behavior.
(G) This iswhy a crucial revolution in the behavioral sciences is and
will be the computational modeling: the radical “operational”
approach. There is no alternative to this especially if one has to
model the process at a given micro-layer, and the processes at
the macro-layer, and also the emergent (bottom-up) and the
immergent (top-down) feedbacks, and how all this works.
I will only focus on issues (A) (C) (D) (G), and in a quite
schematic and assertive way also on (B). However, there is a coher-
ence between the central claim of section 5 (point D) on “social”
theory (social action and minds are crucial but not enough; we
need a theory of the self-organizing macro social order and of
its feedback at the micro level) and the seemingly far polemic on
(B; brain and mind): layered view is needed because reality is a
recursive multi-layered “emergent” complex system: not only we
have emergence (and self-organization) from individual to collec-
tive, but also from micro neuro-processes and macro functions
in brain, and from brain to mental activities, and from cognitive
micro-constituents (like beliefs or goals) to complex mental states
“gestalts,” like an intention (Knowledge–Motivation Commerce),
an expectation, or an emotions like hope (Miceli andCastelfranchi,
2014); and so on (A Layered Science for a Layered World).
COGNITIVE MECHANISMS PRODUCING AND CONTROLLING
OUR BEHAVIOR
As we said (A), to explain a given behavior we need to identify its
“proximate” cognitive causes -underlying processes that are irre-
ducible to neuro-processes: representational and functional. Of
course, also neural processes are “representational” and based on
“functional” notions (like “activation,” “inhibition,” “connection,”
etc.), but at a lower micro-level.
In particular, what is needed is a theory of how our behav-
ior is under a “control device”; its mainly goal-governed nature,
and how motivations are organized and processed. This is the
weakest part of psychology: we know everything about knowl-
edge processing and organization (step by step, all the chapters
of a handbook of Cognitive Psychology), but we know very lit-
tle about motivation and its processing. In particular we should
model how our goals (used here as a general term for internal
motivational representations during the cybernetic cycle (Miller
et al., 1960); including wishes, desires, concerns, intentions, and
so on) are processed (activated, chosen, preferred, planned) on
the basis of our beliefs, and how we acquire and integrate or
revise them. The central mechanism of mind is the “commerce”
between goals and beliefs (the two basic families of mental repre-
sentations). Of course also other “mechanisms” are there; simple
reﬂexes, conditioned reactions, habits, routines, scripts, and so on.
To exemplify the kind of cognitive architecture we should
model, let us focus on the last stage of the processing of a goal
and on its ﬁnal package, which regulates intentional action (as a
speciﬁc kind of “behavior”).
KNOWLEDGE–MOTIVATION COMMERCE
Intentions are those goals that actually drive our voluntary actions
or are ready/prepared to drive them. They are not another prim-
itive (like in BDI model inspired by Bratman’s theory, e.g., Rao
and Georgeff, 1995), a different mental object with respect to
goals. They are just a kind of goal: the ﬁnal stage of a successful
goal-processing, which also includes “desires” in the broad sense,
with very speciﬁc and relevant properties (see also Castelfranchi
and Paglieri, 2007). Let’s remark that the creation of two dis-
tinct “primitives,” basic independent notions/objects (“desires” vs.
“intentions”) is in part due to the wrong choice of adopting (also
in accordance with common sense) “desires” as the basic motiva-
tional category and source. We criticize this reductive move, and
introduce a more general and basic (and not fully common sense)
teleonomic notion of “goal.” This notion also favors a better uni-
ﬁcation of goal kinds and a better theory of their structural and
dynamic relationships.
In a nutshell (Figure 1), in our model an intention is a goal that:
(1) Has been activated (by a physiological stimulus, an impulse,
or an emotion, or just by a new belief) and processed.
(2) Has been evaluated (beliefs) as not impossible, and not self-
realizing or already realized by another agent, and thus up
to us: we have to act in order to achieve it. An intention is
always the intention to “do something” (including inactions).
We cannot really have intentions about the actions of other
autonomous agents. When we say something like “I have the
intention that John goes to Naples” what we actually mean
is “I have the intention to bring it about that John goes to
Naples.”
(3) Has been chosen against other possible active and conﬂicting
goals, on the basis of an evaluation (beliefs) of the outcomes
and possible costs and we have “decided” to pursue it as
preferable (greater expected value) to its competitors.
(4) Is consistent with other intentions of ours; a simple goal can
be contradictory, inconsistent with other goals, but, once it
is chosen, it becomes an intention and has to be coherent
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FIGURE 1 | Beliefs in Goal-Processing (Castelfranchi and Paglieri, 2007).
with the other intentions (beliefs about action conditions,
resources, and compatibility in the word; Castelfranchi and
Paglieri, 2007). Decision-making serves precisely the function
of selecting those goals that are feasible and coherent with
each other, and allocating resources and planning one’s actual
behavior.
(5) Implies the agent’s beliefs that she knows (or will/can know)
how to achieve it, that she is able to perform theneeded actions,
and that there are or will be the needed conditions for the
intention’s realization; at least the agent believes that she will
be able and in condition to “try.”
(6) Being “chosen” implies a commitment with ourselves, a mort-
gage on our future decisions; intentions have priority over
new possible competing goals, and are more persistent than
the latter (Bratman, 1987).
(7) Is“planned”; we allocate/reserve some resources (means, time,
etc.) for it; and we have formulated or decided to formulate
a plan consisting of the actions to be performed in order to
achieve it. An intention is essentially a two-layer structure:
(a) the “intention that,” the aim, that is, the original goal (for
example, to be in Naples tomorrow); (b) the “intention to do,”
the sub-goals, the planned executive actions (to go to the sta-
tion, buy the ticket, take the train, etc.). There is no intention
without (more or less) speciﬁed actions to be performed, and
there is no intention without a motivating outcome of such
action(s).
(8) Thus an intention is the ﬁnal product of a successful goal-
processing that leads to a goal-driven behavior.
Thus “intention” is not a simple mental object (although
outcome of a complex process); it is a complex conﬁg-
uration with its anatomy: of supporting beliefs and of
goals in a means-end relation, and with an impendent
commitment.
After a decision to act, an intention is already there even if the
concrete actions are not fully speciﬁed or are not yet in execu-
tion, because some condition for their execution is not currently
available. Intentions can be found in two stages:
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(a) Intention “in action,” that is, guiding the executive intentional
action;
(b) Intention “in agenda” (“future directed,” those more central
to the theories of Bratman, Searle, and other), that is, already
planned and waiting for some lacking condition for their exe-
cution: time, money, skills, etc. For example, I may have the
intention to go to Capri next Easter (the implementation of
my “desire” of spending Easter in Capri), but now is Febru-
ary 17, and I am not going to Capri or doing anything for
that; I have just decided to do so at the right moment; it is
already in my “agenda” and binds my resources and future
decisions.
I would also say that an “intention” is “conscious,”we are aware
of our intentions and we “deliberate” about them; however, the
problem of unconscious goal-driven behavior is open and quite
complex (see Bargh et al., 2001).
During the several steps of its processing, an intention – and
its original goal – is supported by those beliefs (on the past, the
present, or the future) that are ﬁltering and supporting it. When-
ever one of such beliefs changes, there may be a problem for the
supported goal, which may be either put in a “waiting room” or
abandoned as impossible, already achieved, no longer interesting
(because another is deemed to be preferable.), etc. When dealing
with cognitive agents, in order to change their behavior we have
to change their goals (and thus their intentions), but in order to
change their goals we have to change their beliefs.
THE NEURAL IMPLEMENTATION OF PSYCHOLOGICAL
REPRESENTATIONS AND PROCESSES
A neuroscience of human behavior should in primis be the neural
modeling of cognitive mechanisms and processes postulated by the
Cognitive Sciences.
Neuroscience shouldn’t give us a brain “cartography”of behav-
iors and feelings: cartography has never been a “science” (just a
technique); it explains nothing, it is just description. What we
need is the brain/body implementation of speciﬁc functions and
models of elaboration of representations, which determine our
conduct.
THE NEUROSIS OF BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES
Neuroscientists shouldn’t try to “skip” psychology and its
information-processing models of structures and manipulations,
for directly connecting brain with behavior (neuro-economics,
neuro-aesthetics, neuro-ethics, neuro-politics,. . .). On the con-
trary they should take the procedural (possibly computational)
models of the cognitive sciences and ﬁnd their neural grounding
or – if this proves unfeasible – change them. In fact, a cognitive
model that is not grounded in our brain and somatic processes
is just wrong, unacceptable. And – on the other side – psy-
chology should provide models of proximate processes; not just
correlational “theories,” which say nothing on the mechanisms.
Actually, there is a minority of approaches that look me rather
different and going in amuchmore promising direction: to analyze
the speciﬁc “implementation” of psychological processes and model
in brain functions, processes, and“goals”(Goals vs. Pseudo-goals).
Aimed to materialize (they say “embody”) cognitive functions in
their physical and informational substrate. A very good prototype
is for example (Friston et al., 2013) work on the physical dynamics
in the brain that implement the functions andpsychologicalmech-
anisms (conﬁdence, expected utility, attainability, inferences, etc.)
postulated in decision-making processes.
Nevertheless, in my view, the shortcut temptation I’m pointing
on is there, is dominant, and is a misleasing perspective.
The problem is: will neurosciences be able to distinguish, for
example, between mere anticipation of beneﬁts or costs, where
the expected (and perhaps desirable) result is just predicted, and
when this anticipatory representation plays the functional role of
(achievement or avoidance) goal? Moreover, expected outcomes
that we predict and appreciate/desire are not the same of the
expected outcomes thatmotivate our actions: that is, not just addi-
tional positive results but those that are necessary and sufﬁcient for
acting.
This is a really crucial distinction (that must be neurologi-
cally founded) for a theory of human conduct. Without that it
would/will be impossible to distinguish, for example, between:
– Utility-driven vs. value- or norm-driven behavior; or between
– True “altruistic” and non-altruistic pro-social actions.
In fact – in psychological terms – the altruistic nature of an
action only depends on the mind-set of the agent. Considering an
act as“altruistic”implies a“judgment onmere intent1.”“Altruistic”
is a subjective notion, relative to the underlying mental represen-
tations (especially the motivational ones); it is not – in human
beings – just a behavioral and objective notion. It is not enough
that a given conduct is beneﬁcial for Y and costly for X (the agent);
even if the beneﬁt is intentional. It is necessary to ascribe to X
the motivation to favor Y’s wellbeing, rather than some possible
expected (external or internal) reward. Thus it would be insufﬁ-
cient to ﬁnd that these conducts are associated with the activation
of a brain area which is related to a “predictive” or anticipatory
activity, or to pro-social emotions.
Another example is offered by the neural version of “trust.”
As Fehr writes: “the rationale for the experiment originates in
evidence indicating that oxytocin plays a key role in certain pro-
social approach behaviors in non-human mammals. (. . .) Based
on the animal literature, Kosfeld et al. (2005), hypothesized that
oxytocin might cause humans to exhibit more behavioral trust as
measured in the trust game” (Fehr, 2009). In these experiments
they also show how oxytocin has a speciﬁc effect on social behavior
because it differently impacts on the trustor and the trustee (only
in the ﬁrst case there is a positive inﬂuence). In addition, it is
also shown that the trustor’s sensitivity to risk is not reduced as a
general behavior but it depends on the partner nature (human ver-
sus non-human). These are no doubt interesting data. However,
the multidimensional and very articulated notion of trust should
not be reduced to a generic pro-social attitude and to a particular
chemical response or the mere activation of a given brain area.
Trust is not a simple, vague, and unitary notion and disposition;
it is made of (rather complex) evaluations, expectations, attribu-
tions, decisions to rely, sentiments. It should be a componential
and analytical psychological model of trust to drive the neural
1Beneﬁcium non in eo quod ﬁt aut datur consistit, sed in ipso dantis aut facientis
animo: a beneﬁt consists not in what is done or given, but in the intention of the
giver or doer (Seneca, De Beneﬁciis Libro I, 6).
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research rather than searching for a simplistic and direct solution,
just localistic and correlational (Castelfranchi, 2009).
Analogously, consider norm compliance: will neurosciences
be able to distinguish the explicit understanding and process-
ing of a norm and the decision (and reasons) to comply with
it, from a merely habitual conforming conduct? And in motivated
obedience will neurosciences distinguish between just expected
possible sanctions and a decision “motivated” by that avoidance?
Will they reduce norms just to the activation of feared punish-
ments or of inhibitory responses? Psychologically speaking, these
are very different processes, with quite different socio-political
implications.
Finally, we should accept the idea that, in social “games” and
scripts, part of the mental attitudes we ascribe to others are not
“materially” in their brains. Also mind is an“as if,” an“institutional
construct.” We ascribe certain contents (knowledge, goals,. . .) to
others and we act on such as basis, as if they were materially there,
and this works in our “social pretending”: we give them a real,
pragmatic, effect, like when we turn pieces of paper into money,
by accepting and using them as such (Castelfranchi, 2013). For
example, for sure you “know” that 126 + 32 = 158, or you “know”
that Athens is not the capital of Italy, but do you really have this
knowledge written in a ﬁle of your brain? Not at all! Only after
you derived it, not before; however, you implicitly and potentially
“know” that and I know that you know and interact with you on
such a basis.
Mind is not independent on brain, and in general on a material
support of “information processing.”Mind is what the brain does
but not at its micro level; at the level of macro-functions and com-
plex object (representations). However, “mind” is not only what
the brain does. Not only becausewemight haveminds“embodied”
in other “machineries” or supports (also at the distributed social
interaction level); but because mind is also an “intentional stance”
creation, attribution, ascription in order to explain, predict the
behavior, and interact with. It is a crucial “instititional” object,
even independent of its brain content, like the “value” of money,
no longer dependent on gold.
ARBITRARY ASSUMPTIONS IN MIND-BRAIN-BEHAVIOR RELATION
The current views on the relation between psychological processes
and their neuro-chemical substratum often betray some question-
able assumptions. For example, whereas it is very reasonable to
suppose that psychological and support interventions may have
an impact on cerebral regulation, at a biological level, this by no
means implies that the origin of the problem was biological, in
terms of a biochemical or neural malfunction.
Mental representations and psychological processes are per se
IN our brain (if not, where else might they be found?!) and are
processes OF our brain. Every construction, acquisition, or elabo-
ration of them just is a neural pattern/process in which our mind
materially consists and is implemented2.
However, to acknowledge this truism does not mean that
research at the psychological layer has no longer need to be
2However, also consider other bases of mental entities and process, in term of
externalization and distributed cognition, or in radically institutional, conventional
terms (as we have just said).
conducted: psychological notions and models should be neu-
rologically grounded, not “eliminated” (Computational Science
for Reconciling “Emergence” with “Cognition”); moreover, one
should be aware of the (not just theoretical) risks of biological
reductionism and their impact on public opinion; consider for
instance the growing tendency of psychiatry to adopt (in theory
and in practice) a bio-pharmacological approach, and its prob-
lematic consequences at the scientiﬁc, social, political, and ethical
levels.
Actually, there is a non sequitur between the (obvious) idea
that dysfunctional/psychopathological (and recovery) processes
are brain processes and
(i) the assumption that therefore their cause must be a brain
damage, a neural or biochemical dysfunction, a neural disease;
(ii) the assumption that therefore [even independently of claim (i)]
the intervention must necessarily and directly be on the brain
and its functioning.
To think something is a new state of our brain; to learn some-
thing is to modify our brain; to relearn, adjust previous learning,
is to modify our brain again. There might have been (for several
concurrent factors: internal and external, experiential, relational) a
dysfunctional learning, dysfunctional thoughts, and the challenge
is – through new cognitive and affective experiences and men-
tal elaborations – restructuring the learned representations and
processes.
Any change in our conduct or attitudes is/presupposes a change
in our minds; any change in our minds is/ presupposes a change
in our brains (and bodies). Our brain has been materially “writ-
ten” by our conduct. In therapeutic, educational or rehabilitation
interventions the challenge is to preserve this route, and this view.
For changing our brain we do not need to directly act on our brain.
Similarly, for producingwaterwe donot need (and it is evenworst)
to join oxygen and hydrogenous; or for changing genes regulation
not necessarily we manipulate genes (epigenetics).
TWO TELEOLOGIES IMPINGING ON HUMAN BEHAVIOR
As for the biological evolution issue (point C), let me just consider
a crucial theoretical issue (C2), which is often neglected or mis-
treated: the relation between the two kinds of teleology that impinge
on us: the internal goals regulating/controlling our action vs. the
external functions of our conduct.
In modern science there are two well-deﬁned teleological
frames and notions:
The one provided by evolutionary approaches, where it is stan-
dard (and correct) to talk in terms of functions (adaptive) value,
being for something, having a certain ﬁnality/end, providing some
advantage, etc. In this context “goal” (end, function, ﬁnality, etc.)
means the “effect” (outcome) that has selected/reproduced and
maintained a certain feature or behavior – originally just an acci-
dental effect, an effect among many others, but later, thanks to the
loop and positive feedback on its own causes (that is, on the feature
or behavior producing it) no longer a mere effect but the function,
the purpose of that feature, what makes it useful and justiﬁes its
reproduction.
• Theoneprovidedby cybernetic control theory and its postulated
cycle, representations, and functions, in which the agent is able
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to adjust the world through goal-directed behavior, and to
maintain a given desired state of the world (homeostasis).
• Actually, there might be a third teleological/ﬁnalistic notion
used in several sciences (from medicine to social sciences): the
notion of a function of X as a role, a functional component,
an “organ” of a global “system.” For example, the function of
the heart, or of the kidneys, in our body; or the function of
families (or of education or of norms) in a society; or the
function of a given ofﬁce in an organization; etc. However, this
functionalist and systemic notion has never been well deﬁned
and has elicited a lot of problems and criticisms. My view is
that this ﬁnalistic view is correct, but it is reducible to, and
derived from, the previous two kinds of teleology. The organs
are either the result of an evolutionary selection – in that they
contribute to the ﬁtness and reproduction (maintenance) of
that organism – or there is a project, a design, that is, a complex
goal in someone else’s mind, which imposes particular sub-
goals on its parts, components, and tools. Or both.
A serious problem for a (future) science of goals is the fact
that these two fundamental teleological notions/mechanisms have
never been uniﬁed:
(i) Neither conceptually, by looking for a common deﬁnition, a
conceptual common kernel (for example, in terms of circular
causality, feedback, etc.). Do we have and is it possible to have a
general, unique notion of “goal”with two sub-kinds (functions
vs. psychological goals)?
(ii) Nor by solving the problem of the interaction between the two
coexisting forms of ﬁnality.
This constitutes a serious obstacle, and reveals a real ignorance
gap in contemporary science3. For example, as for issue (i), with-
out the aforementioned conceptual uniﬁcation we cannot have a
unitary theory of communication – or a theory of cooperation, of
sociality, etc. – in animal and humans. What today are presented
as uniﬁed theories are just a trick; in fact, those notions – which
necessarily require a goal (for example, communication doesn’t
just require a “reader,” it requires a “sender”: the information is
given on purpose to the receiver/addressee) – are deﬁned in terms
of adaptive functions when applied to simple animals (like insects),
whereas in humans are deﬁned in intentional terms. Thus there is
no uniﬁed notion (and theory) of communication, in that we do
not know the common kernel between a functional device and an
intentional device.
Point (ii) is no less problematic.What is the relationship between
the internally represented goals (motivations, and concrete objectives)
of an agent regulating its behaviors from the inside, and the adaptive
functions that have selected that agent and its behaviors?
Usually, in purposive, goal-driven agents/systems, the function
of their conduct, the adaptive result that has to be guaranteed, is
not internally represented and psychologically pursued; it is not
understood and foreseen (Figure 2). Of course not all the foreseen
outcomes or all the side effects have a function.
3For a deep philosophical and critical discussion of teleologies and the relation with
causal explanation in natural sciences, see Larry Wright fundamental work (Wright,
1976). A remarkable attempt to deal with these problems also is Ruth Millikan’s
work.
FIGURE 2 | Mental Goals and possible functions.
The internal motivations (and whatever solutions and instru-
mental goals they generate) may just be sub-goals of the “external”
goals of the behavior, of its functions; they are just “cognitive
mediators” of the (biological or social) functions that would be
non-representable and mentally non-computable. For example,
only very recently we have discovered why we have to eat, the real
functions/effects of our food in our organisms (proteins, carbo-
hydrates, vitamins, etc.); and very few people eat in view of such
effects. We eat for hunger or for pleasure or for habit. Analogously,
we do not usually make courtship and sex in view of reproduction;
we are driven by other internal motives.
Because our behavior may respond to two kinds of teleology –
internal, driving goals (control theory model) vs. external selective
functions, either biological or social (Castelfranchi, 2001) – this
is why there might be conﬂicts between one’s internal goal and
the function of one’s action/behavior – also considering that we
do not necessarily understand and thus intentionally pursue our
biological or social functions. We may even act against the func-
tions of our behavior. We may even cut the adaptive connection
between our motives and their original functions, for example by
deciding to have sex without inseminating or without establish-
ing/maintaining any friendly/affective/supportive relation with
our mate. As for social functions, an example of a conﬂict between
our goals and our role function could be the goal that B be
condemned while I’m his defense attorney.
As for social functions and roles in general, we play them (cit-
izen, consumer, father, pedestrian,. . .) quite blindly; not because
they are unconscious, or because just based on reinforcement
learning or on mere “habituses” (in Bourdieu’s view; see The
Emergent, Collective, Self-Organizing Effects of our Behaviors),
but because they are external to our minds. In fact, even our
intentional and deliberated actions, evaluated on their (visible and
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conceivable) consequences, may “pursue” collective (good or bad)
external “ends” (Castelfranchi, 2001).
For example, if we realize how marketing induces “needs,” and
deceives andmanipulates us,we couldn’t playwell ourmost crucial
“role” in/for society: the role of “consumers”!
Social functions are parasitic to cognition: they establish and
maintain themselves thanks to and through agents’ mental repre-
sentations but not as mental representations: i.e., without being
necessarily known or at least intended.“By pursuing his own interest
he [the individual] frequently promotes that of the society more
effectually than when he really intends to promote it.” (Adam
Smith; last sentence of cited paragraph in section “The Emergent,
Collective, Self-Organizing Effects of our Behaviors.”) However,
it is possible, and even frequent, that – following our personal
motives – we play our roles in contradiction with the mission and
collective utility of our social function.
GOALS VS. PSEUDO-GOALS
It is also very important to disentangle true goals from pseudo-
goals (Miceli and Castelfranchi, 2012), that is, goals that only seem
to be there and to regulate the system and its behavior. However,
in fact they are not there as goal mechanisms, they are not repre-
sented in the system and “governing” it. They are just functional
ways in which the system has been “designed” (by evolution, by
learning, by the designer); they are the system’s goal-oriented way
of working, its operational rules. For example, a real thermostatic
system (thermostat, thermometer, room, radiator, boiler, etc.) has
been designed in order to reduce naphtha consumption, heat loss,
etc. as much as possible. These are (pseudo)goals of the system,
which works also in order to guarantee them; but they are not
true cybernetic-goals like the set-point of the thermostat. They
are not represented, evaluated, and“pursued”by the system action
cycle.
Analogously, our minds have been shaped (by natural selection,
or culture and learning) in order to have certain working princi-
ples and to guarantee certain functions, which are not explicitly
represented and intended. It seems (from our behavior) that we
have certain goals, but they are not real goals, only pseudo-goals.
This is the case, in our view, of some well-known (and badly
misunderstood) ﬁnalistic notions, like utility maximization, cog-
nitive coherence, and even pleasure. No doubt, we often choose
between different possible goals so as to maximize our expected
utility, giving precedence/preference to the greater expected value;
that is obvious and adaptive. However, this does not mean that we
have “the” goal (the unique and monarchic goal) of maximizing
our utility, indifferently to the speciﬁc contents and goods. On
the contrary, we are moved and motivated by speciﬁc, qualitative
terminal goals of ours (esteem, sex, power, love, etc.), but the
mechanism that has to manage them has been designed and works
so that it maximizes expected utility.
In the same vein, we maintain coherence among our beliefs,
and need to avoid and eliminate contradictions. That is why we
can reject certain information and do not believe all the data we
get (sometimes even what we directly perceive; “we do not believe
our eyes,” literally); the new data must be plausible, credible, inte-
grable,within the context of our preexisting knowledge; otherwise,
we have to revise our previous beliefs on the basis of new (credible)
data. This coherence maintenance is frequently completely auto-
matic and routinely. We have mechanisms for coherence check
and adjustment. We do not usually have any real intention about
the coherence of what we believe. Thus, knowledge coherence is a
pseudo-goal of ours, not a real meta-goal guiding meta-actions.
PLEASURE
Similarly, pleasure is not “the” goal of our activity, and the same
holds for feeling pleasure (or avoiding feeling pain). “Pleasure” –
as a speciﬁc and qualitative subjective experience, sensation (not
as an empty tautological label for goal satisfaction) – normally is
not a goal for us: it is not what we intend to realize/achieve while
acting, what move us for performing that behavior. Of course,
feeling pleasure or avoiding pain might become real goals and
intentionally drive our actions: that is basically the mindset of the
true hedonist, who acts for pleasure and not for whatever practical
consequence his/her action accomplishes. But typically looking
for pleasure and avoiding pain are not a unique ﬁnal goal of ours
(another monarchic view of mind and motivation): rather, they
act as signals for learning, and they help us learning, among other
things, how to generate and evaluate goals.
Those hedonistic philosophies that identify pleasure with
motivation, and relate our goal-oriented activity to pleasure
motivation, should address the following, evident objections:
i. As a matter of fact, several goals when attained do not give us
any pleasure experience; they are just practical results, or consist
in the pursuit of (often unpleasant) duties.
ii. If pleasure is so necessary for goal pursuit and motivated
activity, why it is not necessary at all in cybernetic models of
goal-directed activity and purposive systems? How is it possible to
have a clearly ﬁnalistic and anticipation-driven mechanism, open
to “success” and “failure,” without any pleasure? In other terms,
what is the real function and nature of pleasure in a goal-directed
system? Moreover, pleasure seems to be present in nature (both
phylogenetically and ontogenetically) well before mentally goal-
directed actions. This also suggests that the function of pleasure
has to be different; it does not seem to play the role of a goal.
Inmy view, pleasure ismore related to the notion of“reward,”of
“reinforcement” and learning. Pleasure as an internal reward plays
two fundamental roles: it attaches some value to some achieved
state, which is important when the system can have more than
one of such states, possibly in competition with each other; it
signals that a given outcome (perhaps accidental) “deserves” to be
pursued, is good, has to become a goal (that state, not the pleasure
per se). In this view, pleasure is a signal and a learning device for
goal creation/discovery and for evaluation. It seems very useful in
a system endowed with a “generative” goal mechanism, and which
needs different kinds of evaluation, more or less intuitive, fast,
based on experience or on biological/inherited “preferences,” and
not just on reasoning (with its limits, biases, and slowness).
THE EMERGENT, COLLECTIVE, SELF-ORGANIZING EFFECTS
OF OUR BEHAVIORS
That is how complexity determines the “social order.” Our claim
on issue (D) is that we need an analytic and dynamic theory of the
“invisible hand,” aimed at identifying its underlying mechanisms.
Otherwise we cannot understand societies, etc. We also have to
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understand the relation between the mechanisms regulating the
social order and our intentions and mental representations: that
is, how – without being understood and explicitly represented –
the emergent structure/order feedbacks into and shapes ourminds
and behaviors; not just the“emergence”but also the“immergence”
processes.
The foundational issue of the Social Sciences is themicro-macro
link, the relation between cognition and individual behavior and
social self-organizing phenomena or complex structures and orga-
nizations4; and institutional actions/phenomena (the two facets of
“social order”: the “spontaneous”one and the organized or at least
institutionalized one; Tummolini and Castelfranchi, 2006). This is
the main reason for the existence of the social sciences, what they
have to “explain,” diachronically and synchronically, in its origin
and dynamics.
As remarked by Hayek (1996): “This problem [the problem of
the unintentional emergence of order and of spontaneous institu-
tions] is in no way speciﬁc to economics. . . it is without doubt the
core problem of the whole of social science.”
That is also why Methodological Individualism, although fun-
damental or better necessary, is not sufﬁcient at all as a framework
for explaining social interactions and phenomena (Conte and
Castelfranchi, 1995).
Adam Smith’s original formulation of “THE problem” is – to
me – much deeper and clearer than Hayek’s formulation.
The great question is how [the individual] “which does neither,
in general, intend to pursue the public interest, nor is aware of the
fact that he is pursuing it, . . . is conducted by an invisible hand to
promote an end that is not part of his intention” (Smith, 1976).
The problem is “how” the Invisible Hand does really work; in
the end, we should (and could) explain the “mechanism” and its
reproductive feedback on the agents’ minds and behaviors.
In Smith’s view of the “Invisible Hand”:
(1) there are intentions and intentional behavior;
(2) some unintended and unaware (long term or complex) effect
emerges from this behavior;
(3) but that effect is not just an effect, it is an end we pursue,
i.e., its orients and controls – in some way – our behavior: we
“necessarily operate for” (Smith, ibid.) that result.
Now:
− what does it mean and how is it possible that we promote with
our action, we in a sense pursue something that is not an inten-
tion of ours; that the behavior of an intentional and planning
agent be goal-oriented, ﬁnalistic, without being intentional?
− in which sense the unintentional effect of our behavior is an
“end”?
4See for example (with a more traditional approach) Sawyer, 2003 or Prietula et al.,
1998; also related with agent-based simulation (Computational Science for Recon-
ciling “Emergence” with “Cognition”). For interdisciplinary and integration based
view close to our position, see also (Dale et al., 2013). Although in our perspective
goal-directed behavior and intended results and self-organization and spontaneous
social order are two complementary and interacting faces of sociality and social the-
ory. We do not think that dynamical system theory is the framework for integrating
human interaction “into a broader account.” Also because the problem is not the
coordination of motor, expressive, and linguistic “inter-action,” but of social con-
ventions, scripts, institutions, and collective self-organizing “order.”We are more in
agreement with the previous Dare’s claim about the need for a“pluralistic”approach
in Cognitive Science.
The real problem is to understand how not only such pro-
cess coexists with an intentional behavior but also exploits it
(Castelfranchi, 2001).
Thus special attention should be devoted not only to the
“emergent” bottom-up processes but also to the “immergent”
ones: the top-down feedback from emergent phenomena to the
agent control-system via learning or through understanding and
intending (Conte et al., 2007).
In particular we have to identify which of the macro-level
phenomena is or has to be mentally represented, understood,
and even intended in order to reproduce itself and be effective
(as it happens with norms), and to discriminate those that are
unintended and blind, and presuppose some form of alienation
(like social functions or institutional powers). What we have to
explain is also how the Invisible Hand and spontaneous (self-
organizing) social order are not so spontaneous and disinterested
or optimal for the involved people but do systematically favor
powerful agents. What is needed is a criticism to von Hayek’s the-
ory (or vulgate) about the spontaneous social order as the best
possible outcome: the often implicit assumption that an under-
standing of the social dynamics, deliberate planning, and intentional
pursuuit of non-individual outcomes could never achieve better
results.
How much the epistemic and motivational representations that
regulate our intentional conduct are shaped by themacro sociolog-
ical, economic, anthropological, political levels? How the former
are functional to the latters, not just mere complex effects and
consequences?
That is: how could the Spontaneous Order not just emerge from
our autonomous acts but maintain and reproduce itself without
actively inﬂuencing and reproducing those acts? Which – however
– are due to our cognitive representations and processes. Thus
it has to shape and reproduce those cognitive mechanisms. The
Invisible Hand works also through and on our minds, by manipu-
lating our mental devices in order to bring out the appropriate (not
understood and unintended) outcomes.
In fact, the problem is not just how a given equilibrium (like
in simple Games) or coherence is achieved and some stable order
emerges. In order to have a “social order”or an “institution” spon-
taneous emergence and equilibrium are not enough. They must
be “functional,” that is self-reproducing by a causal loop.
THE “COGNITIVE MEDIATORS” OF SOCIAL PHENOMENA
Social phenomena are due to the agents’ behaviors, but. . . the
agents’ behaviors are due the mental mechanisms controlling and
(re)producing them.
For example: Our Social Power lies in, consists of, others’
Goals & Beliefs! How do they evaluate us and accept to depend
on us. That’s why we need Mind-Reading! Not only for adjust-
ing ourselves to the others’ interference, but for manipulating and
exploiting the others or for helping or punishing them.
Social and cultural phenomena cannot be deeply accounted
for without explaining how they work through the individual
agents’ minds (the mental “counterparts” or “mediators” of social
phenomena).
Does this mean that social actors fully understand what they
do/construct? No, not necessarily.
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That’s why we use the term: “mediators”: because they are
the mental ingredients necessary for producing that social phe-
nomenon or structure without (necessarily) being the mental
representation (understanding or intending) of the social phenomena
produced by the behaviors that they determine.
So, I play and reproduce a“social function”(of father, consumer,
the witness of a promise, “public opinion,” the follower of a leader,
etc.) without necessarily understanding it, but with something
speciﬁc, corresponding, in my head.
As we said, the problem is social functions impinge not only on
our habits and automatic or ritual behaviors, but on our deliber-
ated and intentional actions. Charging only the non-intentional,
non- deliberate behaviors with those functional aspects is a sim-
plistic solution: according to such a view, role-playing would
just be implemented in “habituses” (Bourdieu and Wacquant,
1992). Thus, when a social actor is consciously deliberating
and planning, he would not play a social role, he would be
“free.” I disagree with such a solution. Social actors play social
roles and accomplish their social functions also through their
deliberate, intentional actions, however they do so not delib-
erately. This is precisely the problem to be addressed; and it
requires a sophisticated model of intentions. We are back to
the issues of (C;Two Teleologies Impinging on Human Behav-
ior).
What is the relationship existing between the social system’s goals
and the goals internal to its members, which directly regulate their
actions?
Are social actors able to understand and represent explicitly in
their minds the social system’s goals? Or are the goals of the social
system simply a projection of the goals of (some of) its members?
Or, do the members’ goals and plans happen to happily coincide
with those of the social system? In other terms: do we intends all
the goals we pursue?
Functions establish and maintain themselves thanks to and
through agents’ mental representations but not as mental represen-
tations: i.e., without being known or at least intended.
COMPUTATIONAL SCIENCE FOR RECONCILING
“EMERGENCE” WITH “COGNITION”
However, “necessary” doesn’t mean “sufﬁcient”: Mind is not
enough. For “explaining” what is happening at the societal and
collective layers we have to model the mind of the actors, but this is
insufﬁcient. The“individualistic plus cognitive”approach – even if
complemented with “collective intentionality,” “joint action,” “we
intend,” etc. – is not sufﬁcient for a social theory and for modeling
social processes. Social actors do not understand, negotiate, and
plan all their collective behavior and cooperative activity. Society
is not “team work.”
This is the real challenge not only for the behavioral and cog-
nitive sciences but for multi-agent systems and Social AI, and
computer-supported societies: Reconciling Emergence with Cog-
nition. Emergence and cognition are not incompatible with one
another; neither are they two alternative approaches to intelligence
and cooperation.
On the one hand, cognition has to be conceived as a level
of emergence (from sub-symbolic to symbolic; from objective to
subjective; from implicit to explicit).
On the other side, emergent and unaware functional social
phenomena (ex. emergent cooperation, and swarm intelligence)
should not be modeled only among sub-cognitive agents (Steels,
1990; Mataric, 1992), but also among intelligent agents. In fact, for
a theory of cooperation and society among intelligent agents – as
we said – mind is not enough, and cognition cannot dominate and
exhaust social complexity (on that Hayek is right; Hayek, 1967).
This is why a crucial revolution in the behavioral sciences is and
will be “computational modeling,” with its radical “operational”
approach. There is no alternative to this, especially if one has to
model at the same time the process at a given micro-layer and the
processes at the macro-layer, and also the emergent (bottom-up)
and the immergent (top-down) feedbacks, and how all this works.
We need a computational modeling of cognitive represen-
tations and manipulation (processing; Cognitive Mechanisms
Producing and Controlling Our Behavior) and a computational
modeling of their neural implementation and of brain very com-
plex dynamics (The Neural Implementation of Psychological
Representations and Processes). The same holds at the social level.
THE THEORETICAL MISSION OF SOCIAL SIMULATION
Agent-based computer simulation of social phenomena is the cru-
cial (revolutionary) challenge for the future of behavioral sciences.
But why is it so?
As we said, the micro-macro link is the foundational issue of the
behavioral sciences: they should investigate the relation between
cognition and individual behavior, on the one hand, and social
self-organizing phenomena or complex structures, organizations,
and institutional actions and entities5 on the other hand. This is
themainmission of the social sciences, what they have to“explain,”
diachronically and synchronically.
No approaches or models for studying this complex phe-
nomenon and eventually understanding its (causal) mechanisms
are better than agent-based computer simulation. It is the only
approach able to model at the same time different layers of process-
ing and their top-down and bottom-up feedbacks and circularity.
We can model more or less complex minds (with goals, beliefs,
reasoning, decisions, etc., but also emotions, reactions, biases, and
perception, learning, etc.) and interaction, dependence networks,
group activity, organization, cooperation and competition, norms,
roles. And we can observe the internal and external dynamics.
Moreover computer implementation of models provide us a
formal validation of the theory predictions, and new experimental
data (by simulation).
CONCLUDING REMARKS
What is the correct relation between social and collective human
behaviors and the individual mind, and between mind and brain?
The answer is: a well-conceived reductionism, preserving different
(interconnected) ontological layers with their vocabulary (like in
chemistry for the notion of “valence” or of “acid”).
A LAYERED SCIENCE FOR A LAYERED WORLD
Nature (and, in nature, society) has different levels of complex-
ity and organization, with the emergence of macro-level entities,
5The two faces of “social order”: the “spontaneous”one and the organized or at least
institutionalized one.
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phenomena and laws, grounded on the entities, properties and
mechanisms of the lower layer (micro).
“Reductionism” should not be the “elimination” of the entities,
notions, dynamics of a given macro level, considered superﬂuous
once it is explained in terms of their micro-entities. “Reduction-
ism” should be “re-conduction”: bringing back and grounding
the macro-dynamics on the underlying ones. The theories of the
macro layer should be not only compatible (non contradictory)
with the laws of the micro one; they have to be grounded and
derivable. Otherwise they are wrong.
Consider for simplicity the following layers of complexity: let’s
ground all on physics (particles, atoms, forces, etc.); on top of
physics, let’s put chemistry, then biology grounded on organic
chemistry, thenneuroscience, thenpsychology, then social sciences
(economics, sociology, anthropology, politics).
Biologyhas to be explained inbiochemical terms, butwe cannot
eliminate the notion of “cells” with their new properties and laws,
although we have to biochemically know how they “work”6.
In the same vein, social and collective behavior is due to the
conduct of individual actors; but individual action is due to men-
tal representations and processes; therefore the principles of social
sciences should be grounded in the underlying mental and behav-
ioral phenomena and laws. However after such a re-conduction
is made, we cannot do without such notions as crowd, market,
inﬂation, government, etc.
Science has for example re-conducted chemical “valence”
(introduced much before atomic modeling) to atomic properties:
particles, their electric charge, etc. To have explained“valence”and
how it works doesn’t make this notion useless; and we couldn’t
put aside notions like “acid,” “basis,” “chemical bonds” although
we have a full grounding and understanding of them in atomic
terms. The Phlogiston theory has been eliminated, because there
was no possible conﬁrmation of the hypothesized processes at the
supporting/implementing layer.
Exactly in the same way we have to re-conduct mental repre-
sentations, functions, and processing to the body and its neural
mechanisms and structures; they are just material, informational
entities7; emergent functions of their ground, described in infor-
mational/functional terms. If it is not possible to bring them back
to their sub-stratum, they are inexistent (like phlogiston); but if
they are brought back to their underlying micro-processes, they
will not be redundant and eliminable. The psychological notions
should be preserved for understanding and explaining “what the
brain is doing”: perceiving, memorizing, retrieving, deciding,
pursuing, and so on; at its macro-functional level of activity.
Neural correlates cannot be the right vocabulary for explaining
human behaviors, just because they are at a micro-level and do
not still represent and discriminate the complex “patterns” and
their properties and functions (not of their sub-components) at
the cognitive and motivational macro-level of working. When
we will have the real neural representation of a complex object
like a “motivating goal,” or an “altruistic intention,” or of real
“trust attitude” (The Neural Implementation of Psychological
Representations and Processes), or a “complex emotion with its
6To say nothing of the “evolutionary theory”: a completely new foundation.
7However, see note 13.
appraisal components” like envy, we will have a quasi-complete
explanation of it (see previous note), but we will not renounce
to that psychological vocabulary; since it holds and works at
the functional/informational macro layer. Also because, there are
other properties of that entity that are due not to its micro-
implementation and mental representation, but to its functions
and relations at themacro anthropological, sociological, economic
level. A table is a “table,” functionally and practically speaking,
although it is just a cluster of molecules of a given substance; how-
ever, at certain level of use its analysis in physical and material
terms is fully irrelevant.
More in general: there are no alternatives to the need for reading
and understanding body in terms of functions, not just in terms of
“simple” matter and its physico-chemical processes description.
We look at the kidney as a “ﬁlter,” at glands in terms of “secre-
tion.”Otherwise we do not understand what they do, that is, what
they are; which is the sense of the physico-chemical processes that
we are describing.
The same obviously holds for our brain (just a body organ).
Brain anatomy must be a “political geography,” not a “geography”
of physical objects/structure: it has to localize the areas of given
psychological functions. And brain physiology (activity) – to be
understood – requires to be read in terms of active psychic pro-
cesses. “Mind” is just a functional notion: the high level function
of neural activity and patterns; and given its emergent, functional,
informational, semiotic-representational (and even institutional)
nature is not “reducible” to brain processes, that just provide its
material implementation.
We need a micro-macro theory, a speciﬁcation of the under-
lying entities and processes producing given phenomena at the
superordinate layer. This is what we call – in strict sense – Science
of “mechanisms.”
THE NEED FOR COMPUTATIONAL MODELING
I claim that there is no alternative to computer modeling. We have
to provide not just mathematical or formal models but computa-
tional ones, if we want to model the proximate causes of a given
phenomenon, and its superﬁcial dynamics; the underlying “mech-
anisms” that determine those behaviors. We also need “synthetic”
modeling, that is, the material construction of the modeled entity
to show how it actually produces the predicted behaviors/effects
in interaction with the environment.
As rightly pointed out by Shieber (2004): “The whole thinking
process is still rather mysterious to us, but I believe the attempt to
make a thinking machine will help us greatly in ﬁnding out how we
think ourselves.”
Computational/synthetic modeling will be pervasive. It will
model any hidden mechanism and “dynamics”: from chemical
reactions, to DNA, from evolution to psychological mechanisms,
to social, economic, historical phenomena. This is the message
and the gift that ICT and in particular AI has to give to science.
Computational modeling will provide not only “models” and
conceptual instruments for the theory, but also experimental plat-
forms, new empirical data obtained through simulation, and new
hypotheses and predictions. Some experiments will be made
possible, which are impossible in “nature,” either for practical,
social, historical, or moral reasons (demography, urbanistic, etc.)
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or for the natural inseparability of some distinguishable mech-
anisms (for example motivational and emotional mechanisms).
This will be crucial both for modeling both proximate causes and
diachronic, evolutionary causes.
Computer simulation of neural, cognitive, social mechanisms
and dynamics, obviously is not the only method for identifying the
proximate causes, but themost promisingmethod for (i) their fully
procedural and formal characterization (ii) with the additional
advantage of “running” the postulated dynamics and seeing their
results (conform or not to predictions), and (iii) to conduct a new
precious kind of experiments, in particular useful for complexity
and emergent effects. The most promising method/tool, especially
for modeling “processes” not just static features (physiology not
just anatomy) (iv) at different layers, but interacting; including
also the bottom-up and the top-down effects, and the resulting
dynamics. It is the only approach able to deal in an integrated way
with all these mechanisms.
Moreover, computers are a fundamental device for intelligently
collecting and analyzing relevant data [from the web, for example
“Big Data,” and from human behavior in natural conditions (traf-
ﬁc, investments, migration, etc.)]. Also in the sense that major
scientiﬁc discoveries will be made by computers (able to manage
BigData, to demonstrate theorems, to interpret the laws andmech-
anisms of that data), but also in the sense of “human” traditional
science supported by computational instruments.
In sum, in a few years, science will be “computational”;
otherwise it will not be.
“MORE GEOMETRICO DEMOSTRATA”
To be more explicit about psychology status: It is unbelievable that
after more than half a century the critical remarks of Wittgenstein
on psychology be still valid: “The confusion and barrenness of psy-
chology is not to be explained by calling it a “young science”; its
state is not comparable with that of physics, for instance, in its
beginnings. (. . .) For in psychology there are experimental methods
and conceptual confusion. (. . .) The existence of the experimental
method makes us think we have the means of solving the problems
that trouble us; though problem and method pass one another by”
(Ludwig Wittgenstein Investigations PII p. 232).
In my view, Psychology is one of the few sciences that do not
ofﬁcially have a clearly separated theoretical domain, with its uni-
versity chairs, conferences, curriculum, . . . like for physics, biology,
economics, . . . without any direct experimental activity (in case
taking into account and explaining the result of their “experimen-
tal” discipline; and anticipating of half a century the empirical
results, like for Einstein theories).
Psychology – probably because of its “guilty” origin from phi-
losophy, and the consequent inferiority complex to the “hard
sciences” – has repressed its theoretical and analytical impulses.
Philosophy is in a sense a party to this somewhat phobic atti-
tude of psychology, because it considers the analytical, formal,
theoretical work as a prerogative of its own. However, philosophi-
cal contributions, though welcome, cannot replace the theoretical
and analytical work that must be internal to psychology.
It is not a matter of “experimental philosophy,” it is a matter of
“theoretical psychology” (Cognitive Science sometime plays such
a role).
We need to have psychological states “more geometrico
demostrata.”
JUST STATISTICAL LAWS AND CONSTRUCTS, AND PROBABILITY?
However, let us conclude with a query about next future, by
following not just optimism of will but pessimism of reason:
Will this analytical and “cognitive mediated” view of social
phenomena and dynamics, and of computational Agent-based
modeling (we hope for) win?
Not so sure at all: we will attend a short cut of statistics,
the impressive power of Big Data, correlations, probability, . . .
An already very robust trend. The title of Mayer-Schonberger
& Cikier’ book is “Big Data: A Revolution That Will Trans-
form How We Live, Work, and Think” and I think that they
are absolutely right; but this revolution will be insufﬁcient
and even deviating if it will just empower our “predition”
capabilities, and will not ground new theoretical understand-
ing of the mechanisms and causal processes underlying soci-
ety and cognition. I worry about Anderson’s profecy: “The
End of Theory: The Data Deluge Makes the Scientiﬁc Method
Obsolete”; prophecy that of course begin to be based on Big
Data! And I care more about scientiﬁc aim and frame than
about scientiﬁc “methods” (See also Anderson, 2008; Harford,
2014).
We are witnessing a growing trend of predicting without
understanding, without modeling the proximate causes.
Does God play dice?
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